Terrorism Defined

October 11, 2010 at 2:12 pm (Legal Definitions) (, )

How is “Terrorism” defined under Philippine laws?

Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as The Anti-Terror Law or The Human Security Act of 2007, which took effect last July 15, 2007, provides for its definition as follows:

SEC. 3. Terrorism. Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

1. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
2. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
3. Article 134-a (Coup de tat), including acts committed by private persons;
4. Article 248 (Murder);
5. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
6. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction,

or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-piracy and Anti-highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

This post is made in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling of the constitutionality of RA 9372.

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CD: Far East Realty Investment Inc. v. CA

September 22, 2010 at 3:45 pm (1988, Case Digests, Legal Definitions) (, , , )

FAR EAST REALTY INVESTMENT INC. v. CA
G.R. No. L-36549 October 5, 1988
Paras, J.

Doctrine:
Where the instrument is not payable on demand, presentment must be made on the day it falls due. Where it is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time after issue, except that in the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof.

• Reasonable Time has been defined as so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonable prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires should be done, having a regard for the rights, and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party.

• No hard and fast demarcation line can be drawn between what may be considered as a reasonable or an unreasonable time, because “reasonable time” depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances in each case.

Facts:
Private respondents asked the petitioner to extend an accommodation loan in the sum of P4,500.00. Respondents delivered to the petitioner a check for P4,500.00, drawn by Dy Hian Tat, and signed by them at the back of said check, with the assurance that after one month from September 13, 1960, the said check would be redeemed by them by paying cash in the sum of P4,500.00, or the said check can be presented for payment on or immediately after one month. Petitioner agreed and extended an accommodation loan

The aforesaid check was presented for payment to the China Banking Corporation, but said check bounced and was not cashed by said bank, for the reason that the current account of the drawer thereof had already been closed. Petitioner demanded payment from the private but the latter failed and refused to pay notwithstanding repeated demands.

Both private respondents raised the defense that both have been wholly discharged by delay in presentment of the check for payment.
The Lower Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, this was reversed by the CA upon appeal by the respondents, ruling that the check was not given as collateral to guarantee a loan secured since the check passed through other hands before reaching the petitioner and the said check was not presented within a reasonable time. Hence this petition.

Petitioner argues that presentment for payment and notice of dishonor are not necessary as when funds are insufficient to meet a check, thus the drawer is liable, whether such presentment and notice be totally omitted or merely delayed.

Issues:
1. Whether or not presentment for payment can be dispensed with
2. Whether or not presentment for payment and notice of dishonor of the questioned check were made within reasonable time

Held:
1. No. Where the instrument is not payable on demand, presentment must be made on the day it falls due. Where it is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time after issue, except that in the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof (Section 71, Negotiable Instruments Law).

2. No. It is obvious in this case that presentment and notice of dishonor were not made within a reasonable time.

Reasonable time” has been defined as so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonable prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires should be done, having a regard for the rights, and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party (Citizens’ Bank Bldg. v. L & E. Wertheirmer 189 S.W. 361, 362, 126 Ark, 38, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 520).

Notice may be given as soon as the instrument is dishonored; and unless delay is excused must be given within the time fixed by the law (Section 102, Negotiable Instruments Law).

In the instant case, the check in question was issued on September 13, 1960, but was presented to the drawee bank only on March 5, 1964, and dishonored on the same date. After dishonor by the drawee bank, a formal notice of dishonor was made by the petitioner through a letter dated April 27, 1968. Under these circumstances, the petitioner undoubtedly failed to exercise prudence and diligence on what he ought to do al. required by law. The petitioner likewise failed to show any justification for the unreasonable delay.

No hard and fast demarcation line can be drawn between what may be considered as a reasonable or an unreasonable time, because “reasonable time” depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances in each case (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. I, Eighth Edition, p. 327).

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Accommodation Party

September 7, 2010 at 9:39 am (Legal Definitions) (, , )

Today, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) reported actor Deither “Diet” Ocampo, together with his partner and a publishing company, being sued for alleged non-payment of debts amounting to over Php. 3.6 million.

In the article, the PDI defined an accommodation party using the internet as a source. The website from which the definition was gathered was not identified.

Now, what is an accommodation party under Philippine jurisprudence?

Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides for the definition of an accommodation party:

Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party. – An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party.

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Doctrine of Innocent Purchaser

August 18, 2010 at 9:25 am (Legal Definitions) (, )

Today, the Supreme Court is set to hear the oral arguments of the petition involving the Hacienda Luisita dispute. Petitioners, who are also President Benigno Aquino III’s cousins, are seeking to overturn a 2005 decision by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) scratching the stock distribution option (SDO) under CARP reached in 1989.

One of the issues to be discussed is whether the Luisita Industrial Park Corp. and Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., as transferees of a portion of the 6,500-hectare estate, may invoke the “doctrine of innocent purchaser.”

Now, what is exactly the doctrine of innocent purchaser?

The subject is summarily discussed in the case of Tan v. Dela Vega, G.R. No. 168809, 10 July 2006.

Accordingly, the doctrine of innocent purchaser rules that a void title may be the source of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.

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