Terrorism Defined

October 11, 2010 at 2:12 pm (Legal Definitions) (, )

How is “Terrorism” defined under Philippine laws?

Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as The Anti-Terror Law or The Human Security Act of 2007, which took effect last July 15, 2007, provides for its definition as follows:

SEC. 3. Terrorism. Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

1. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
2. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
3. Article 134-a (Coup de tat), including acts committed by private persons;
4. Article 248 (Murder);
5. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
6. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction,

or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-piracy and Anti-highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

This post is made in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling of the constitutionality of RA 9372.

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CD: Sibal v. Valdez

October 1, 2010 at 6:13 pm (1927, Case Digests) (, , , )

SIBAL v. VALDEZ
G.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927
Johnson, J.

Doctrine:
A crop raised on leased premises belongs to the lessee and in no sense forms part of the immovable.

“Ungathered products” have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase “personal property” should be understood to include “ungathered products.” Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty.

A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence. A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.

Facts:
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.

Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal property hence not subject to redemption.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the sugar cane is to be classified as personal property
2. Whether or not future crops to be harvested can be considered a valid object of sale

Held:
1. No. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment creditors.

Ungathered products” have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase “personal property” should be understood to include “ungathered products.” Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty.

2. Yes. A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and then title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence (Emerson vs. European Railway Co., 67 Me., 387; Cutting vs. Packers Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep., 63.).

A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.

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CD: Robles v. Hermanos

October 1, 2010 at 4:47 pm (1927, Case Digests) (, , )

ROBLES v. HERMANOS
G.R. No. L-26173 July 13, 1927
Street, J.

Doctrine:
The lessee may prove an independent verbal agreement on the part of the landlord to put the leased premises in a safe condition.

The appraised value of the property may be used to determine the price.

Facts:
A parcel of land was originally owned by the parents of the present plaintiff, Zacarias Robles. Upon the death of his father, plaintiff leased the parcel of land from the administrator with the stipulation that any permanent improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda should be made at the expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the term. As the place was in a run-down state, and it was foreseen that the lessee would be put to much expense in bringing the property to its productive capacity, the annual rent was fixed at the moderate amount of P2,000 per annum.

The plaintiff made various improvements and additions to the plant. The firm of Lizarraga Hermanos was well aware of the nature and extent of these improvements.

When the plaintiff’s mother died, defendant came forward with a proposal to buy the heirs’ portion of the property. In consideration that the plaintiff should shorten the term of his lease to the extent stated, the defendant agreed to pay him the value of all betterments that he had made on the land and furthermore to purchase from him all that belonged to him personally on the land. The plaintiff agreed to this.

On the ensuing instrument made, no reference was made to the surrender of the plaintiff’s rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should end; nor is anything said concerning the improvements which the plaintiff had placed. At the same time the promise of the defendant to compensate for him for the improvements was wanting. Accordingly, the representative of the defendant explained that this was unnecessary in view of the confidence existing between the parties.

On the part of the defendant it was claimed that the agreement with respect to compensating the plaintiff for improvements and other things was never in fact made.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the lessee may contest the validity of a written contract with oral evidence
2. Whether or not the appreciation value can be used to determine the price

Held:
1. Yes. In case of a written contract of lease, the lessee may prove an independent verbal agreement on the part of the landlord to put the leased premises in a safe condition. The verbal contract which the plaintiff has established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated. In the case before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters.

2. Yes. The stipulation with respect to the appraisal of the property did not create a suspensive condition. The true sense of the contract evidently was that the defendant would take over the movables and the improvements at an appraised valuation, and the defendant obligated itself to promote the appraisal in good faith. As the defendant partially frustrated the appraisal, it violated a term of the contract and made itself liable for the true value of the things contracted about, as such value may be established in the usual course of proof. Furthermore, an unjust enrichment of the defendant would result from allowing it to appropriate the movables without compensating the plaintiff thereof.

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CD: Lichauco v. Olegario

October 1, 2010 at 10:06 am (1922, Case Digests) (, , )

LICHAUCO v. OLEGARIO
G.R. No. L-17709 June 20, 1922
Romualdez, J.

Doctrine:
An execution debtor has the perfect right to sell his right of redemption.

Facts:
A judgement was rendered against Olegario in a case, where he is also a defendant, wherein certain real properties of his are sold at a public auction in which he shall receive Php. 10,000, as offered, for these properties.

Gregorio Olegario sold to his cousin and brother-in-law Dalmacio Olegario, the other defendant in this case, his right of redemption over the aforesaid properties, executing the proper deed of sale, which was registered in the registry on the date of the conveyance. The plaintiff alleges that this sale is fictitious, — the result of a fraudulent conspiracy between the herein defendants.

Issue:
Whether or not an execution debtor has the authority to sell his right of redemption

Held:
Yes. An execution debtor has the perfect right to sell his right of redemption.

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CD: Yu Tek v. Gonzales

September 30, 2010 at 2:58 pm (1915, Case Digests) (, , )

YU TEK v. GONZALES
G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915
Trent, J.

Doctrine:
There is a perfected sale with regard to the “thing” whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated from all other articles.

Facts:
Gonzalez received P3,000 from Yu Tek and Co. and in exchange, the former obligated himself to deliver 600 piculs of sugar of the first and second grade, according to the result of the polarization, within the period of three months. It was also stipulated that in case Gonzales fails to deliver, the contract will be rescinded he will be obligated to return the P3,000 received and also the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity for loss and damages.

Plaintiff proved that no sugar had been delivered to him under the contract nor had he been able to recover the P3,000.

Gonzales assumed that the contract was limited to the sugar he might raise upon his own plantation; that the contract represented a perfected sale; and that by failure of his crop he was relieved from complying with his undertaking by loss of the thing due.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale

Held:
No. This court has consistently held that there is a perfected sale with regard to the “thing” whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated from all other articles.

In the case at bar, the undertaking of the defendant was to sell to the plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar of the first and second classes. Was this an agreement upon the “thing” which was the object of the contract? For the purpose of sale its bulk is weighed, the customary unit of weight being denominated a “picul.” Now, if called upon to designate the article sold, it is clear that the defendant could only say that it was “sugar.” He could only use this generic name for the thing sold. There was no “appropriation” of any particular lot of sugar. Neither party could point to any specific quantity of sugar and say: “This is the article which was the subject of our contract.”

We conclude that the contract in the case at bar was merely an executory agreement; a promise of sale and not a sale. There was no perfected sale.

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CD: Lutero v. Siuliong

September 30, 2010 at 2:04 pm (1930, Case Digests) (, , )

LUTERO v. SIULIONG
G.R. No. L-31125 January 21, 1930
Villa-real, J.

Doctrine:
Contracts of sale of agricultural products to be delivered in future, fixing a selling price, are not usurious or illegal, even when the market price of the products sold should turn out to be higher at the time of delivery.

Facts:
Plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant to sell the former’s future sugar crop harvest to the latter at a price depending on the class of the sugar. The defendant bound itself to pay an advance amount of Php. 3,000 and the remainder shall be paid from time to time. The contract also stated that should the plaintiff fail to deliver, he shall pay the amount of the undelivered portion to the defendant. The plaintiff also entered into a mortgage agreement to secure his performance in the contract.

Issue:
Whether or not future products are invalid subjects in a contract of sale

Held:
No. The contracts of sale of agricultural products to be delivered in future, fixing a selling price, are not usurious or illegal, even when the market price of the products sold should turn out to be higher at the time of delivery.

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CD: Dela Cruz v. Legaspi and Samperoy

September 29, 2010 at 11:10 am (1955, Case Digests) (, , )

DELA CRUZ v. LEGASPI AND SAMPEROY
G.R. No. L-8024 November 29, 1955
Bengzon, J.

Doctrine:
Subsequent non-payment of the price at the time agreed upon did not convert the contract into one without cause or consideration: a nudum pactum.

Facts:
Plaintiff sued defendant Legaspi to compel delivery of the parcel of land sold to plaintiff. The complaint alleged the defendant’s refusal to accept payment of the purchase price of P450 undue retention of the realty.

The defendants alleged that before the document of sale was made, the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendants the price right after the document is executed that very day but after the document was signed and ratified by the Notary Public and after the plaintiff has taken the original of the said document, the sad plaintiff refused to pay. They asserted that for lack of consideration and for deceit, the document of said should be annulled.

Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale is void on the ground that it lacks consideration

Held:
No. It cannot be denied that when the document was signed the cause or consideration existed: P450. The document specifically said so. Subsequent non-payment of the price at the time agreed upon did not convert the contract into one without cause or consideration: a nudum pactum. (Levy vs. Johnson, 4 Phil. 650; Puato vs. Mendoza, 64 Phil, 457). The situation was rather one in which there is failure to pay the consideration, with its resultant consequences. In other words, when after the notarization of the contract, plaintiff failed to hand the money to defendants as he previously promised, there was default on his part at most, and defendants’ right was to demand interest — legal interest —.

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CD: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Constantino

September 29, 2010 at 10:44 am (1970, Case Digests) (, , )

CIR v. CONSTANTINO
G.R. No. L-25926 February 27, 1970
Reyes, J.B.L., J.

Doctrine:
The transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid or promised is the essence of sale. If such transfer puts the transferee in the attitude or position of an owner and makes him liable to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price, and not merely as an agent who must account for the proceeds of a resale, the transaction is a sale; while the essence of an agency to sell is the delivery to an agent, not as his property, but as the property of the principal, who remains the owner and has the right to control sales, fix the price, and terms, demand and receive the proceeds less the agent’s commission upon sales made.

That the dealer issues his own sales invoice to the customer is neither a means of acquiring ownership nor is it proof of ownership.

Facts:
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed against and demanded from respondent Constantino the commercial broker’s percentage tax of 6% on his gross compensation for 1956, as dealer or distributor of the products of International Harvester, Macleod, Inc. (IHM).

Respondent is designated as the exclusive dealer of the products IHM within a prescribed territory. In classifying himself as an independent merchant instead of a commercial broker, respondent Constantino cites that he may buy IHM products for Resale to his customers; that he is granted trade discounts and a cash discount under certain conditions; that he may purchase service parts on open credit account or on a 30-day term; and that he sold service parts to his customers on cash basis. Constantino also cited the fact that his purchases are covered by IHM’s sales invoices, and when he re-sells he issues his own sales invoice.

Constantino protested the assessment on the ground that he is not a commercial broker. On his protest being overruled, he filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals, which, after trial, found for him. Upon his reversal by the tax court, the CIR interposed the present appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the relationship between the respondent and IHM is that of a vendor and a vendee

Held:
No. A casual examination of respondent’s evidence may give the impression that this relationship with the company is that of vendor and vendee, but a closer look into the actual legal effect of the terms and conditions embodied, rather than the names of the contracts used or the terminologies employed, in the chain of documents shows that the relation between the company and the respondent is one of principal and agent.

Respondent failed to state or notice, however, the condition in his agreement with IHM, which is in small print, that the title of the goods delivered under this order shall remain in IHM until the full purchase price shall have been paid in cash or acceptable security. That the dealer should issue his own sales invoice to the customer is neither a means of acquiring ownership nor is it proof of ownership.

Since the company retained ownership of the goods, even as it delivered possession unto the dealer for resale to customers, the price and terms of which were subject to the company’s control, the relationship between the company and the dealer is one of agency, tested under the following criterion:

The difficulty in distinguishing between contracts of sale and the creation of an agency to sell has led to the establishment of rules by the application of which this difficulty may be solved. The decisions say the transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid or promised is the essence of sale. If such transfer puts the transferee in the attitude or position of an owner and makes him liable to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price, and not merely as an agent who must account for the proceeds of a resale, the transaction is a sale; while the essence of an agency to sell is the delivery to an agent, not as his property, but as the property of the principal, who remains the owner and has the right to control sales, fix the price, and terms, demand and receive the proceeds less the agent’s commission upon sales made (Salisbury v. Brooks, 94 SE 117, 118-119).

The control by the company of the resale made, or agreed upon to be made, by the dealer is so pervasive as to exclude the idea of the latter being an independent merchant. As respondent is not an independent merchant, but an agent, the discount of 16% that he receives is not a “trade discount” but a compensation or profit for selling or bringing about sales or purchases of merchandise for the company.

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Criminal Law 101

September 27, 2010 at 9:42 am (Legal Articles) (, )

With Due Respect : Criminal law 101
By Artemio V. Panganiban
Columnist
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: September 25, 2010

MANILA, Philippines—Media’s deafening howl over the Supreme Court’s decision (Lumanog vs. People, Sept. 7, 2010) convicting—via a vote of 10-4 with one abstention—the so-called “Abadilla 5” for the 1996 murder of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla echoed a lot of questions. To answer them systematically, I will lay down some basics of criminal law.
Crime and criminal. To secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove (1) that the crime charged in the “information” had taken place and (2) that the accused perpetrated it. An act or omission cannot be deemed a crime unless a law defines it as such and provides a penalty for it.

For example, no law punishes the failure to pay a debt. In fact, the Constitution bars the imprisonment of anyone for failure to honor a debt due to poverty. But, there is a civil obligation to repay it. A deliberate refusal to obey a court order to pay a debt (when the debtor has the means) can constitute contempt and can be punished with incarceration.

The information, which is prepared by a government prosecutor, must contain a concise statement of ultimate facts, which—if proven—will constitute a specific offense (like murder, rape or theft). If the facts alleged in the information are not proven, or—even if proven—do not constitute a crime punishable by law, then the accused deserve an acquittal without having to prove their innocence.

Even if they plead guilty, the accused cannot be convicted and punished if—to repeat—the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a crime. Moreover, when the crime charged is capital in nature (punishable by life imprisonment), the prosecution is still required to prove the facts constituting the offense, even if the accused has already pleaded guilty.

The Bill of Rights says, “the accused…has the right to be informed… of the nature and cause of the accusation.” So, he (or she) can be liable only for a crime he had been “informed” of, or one stated in the information. Except when the crime proven is necessarily included in the crime charged.

For example, if the crime charged is murder, but the prosecution proved only homicide, then the accused can be convicted only of homicide. If the crime charged is homicide, the accused cannot be held liable for murder even if murder was proven. Reason: murder includes homicide but not vice-versa. Murder is really homicide with an added “qualifying circumstance” like treachery.

The identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime—whether as principal, accomplice or accessory—must also be proven. The Constitution presumes everyone—citizen or alien, man or woman, young or old—to be innocent of any crime.

Degree of proof needed. Both the commission of the crime and the identity of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. “Proof beyond reasonable doubt” does not entail absolute certainty. Rather, it refers to “that degree of proof which, after an examination of the entire records of the case, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the accused for the crime proved.”

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires a much higher degree of certainty than “preponderance of evidence” (required in civil cases) which “means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.” It is also stricter than “substantial evidence” (required in administrative proceedings like labor cases), which refers “to that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

A judgment of acquittal “shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his (or her) guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” In other words, a judgment of acquittal does not necessarily mean that the accused is innocent but that the prosecution failed to adduce that degree of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) needed to convict. As the legal maxim goes, “to doubt is to acquit.”

Proof of guilt, not of innocence, required. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it reasonably doubts their guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable. To stress, the presumption of innocence may be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Aside from the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, there are other reasons why a criminal case could be dismissed or an accused acquitted even if they are actually guilty. One is where the constitutional rights of the accused are violated so grossly that due process is effectively denied them.

For example, an unreasonable delay of more than 10 years to resolve a criminal case, without fault on the part of the accused and despite their earnest effort to have their case decided, violates the constitutional right to speedy trial and entitles them to instant acquittal without need to determine whether the evidence proves them guilty or not.

There are other ways of getting a criminal case dismissed via a motion to quash, like lack of jurisdiction of the court over the offense charged, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, or lack of authority on the part of the officer who filed the information, or when the crime charged has prescribed, when the information charges more than one offense, or when the right against double jeopardy would be infringed.

* * *

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CD: Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals

September 23, 2010 at 2:03 pm (1990, Case Digests) (, , , , , , )

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-49188 January 30, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Doctrine:
• The payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.

• Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment.

• A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized.

• As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss.

• Execution is for the sheriff to accomplish while satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to achieve the implementing officer’s duty should not stop at his receipt of payments but must continue until payment is delivered to the obligor or creditor.

• Laws are to be interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth. Logic has its limits in decision making. We should not follow rulings to their logical extremes if in doing so we arrive at unjust or absurd results.

Facts:
Amelia Tan filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. The Lower Court ruled in her favor. Upon appeal, the CA upheld the decision of the Lower Court with only minor modifications as to the damages to be awarded to Amelia Tan. The corresponding writ of execution was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes for enforcement. Checks were in the name of Sheriff Reyes.

Four months later, Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, remained unsatisfied.

Petitioner answered that it has already satisfied its obligation, as evidenced by check vouchers signed and received by Sheriff Reyes. The Court has summoned the sheriff to explain the delay but apparently he absconded or disappeared.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name operate to satisfy the judgment debt
2. Whether or not the judgment debtor shall bear the loss for the amount encashed by the absconding sheriff
3. Whether or not execution is the same as satisfaction of judgment

Held:
1. No. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides:

Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. (Emphasis supplied)

Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor to the sheriff should be valid payment to extinguish the judgment debt. There are circumstances, however, which compel a different conclusion such as when the payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks.

Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:

The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.

The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.

In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance.

Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee a public officer has no authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner’s checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.

Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment (See. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).

2. Yes. PAL created a situation which permitted the said Sheriff to personally encash said checks and misappropriate the proceeds thereof to his exclusive personal benefit. For the prejudice that resulted, the petitioner himself must bear the fault. As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. (Blondeau, et al. v. Nano, et al., L-41377, July 26, 1935, 61 Phil. 625).

3. No. Section 15, Rule 39, provides:

Section 15. Execution of money judgments. — The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property, if they be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. …

Strictly speaking execution cannot be equated with satisfaction of a judgment.

Execution is for the sheriff to accomplish while satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to achieve. Section 15, Rule 39 merely provides the sheriff with his duties as executing officer including delivery of the proceeds of his levy on the debtor’s property to satisfy the judgment debt. It is but to stress that the implementing officer’s duty should not stop at his receipt of payments but must continue until payment is delivered to the obligor or creditor.

Dissenting Opinions:
Narvasa, J.
• If payment had been in cash, no question about its validity or of the authority and duty of the sheriff to accept it in settlement of PAL’s judgment obligation would even have arisen. Simply because it was made by checks issued in the sheriff s name does not warrant reaching any different conclusion.

• As payment to the court discharges the judgment debtor from his responsibility on the judgment, so too must payment to the person designated by such court and authorized to act in its behalf, operate to produce the same effect.

Feliciano, J.
• The failure of a sheriff to effect turnover and his conversion of the funds (or goods) held by him to his own uses, do not have the effect of frustrating payment by and consequent discharge of the judgment debtor.

• A judgment debtor who turns over funds or property to the sheriff can not reasonably be made an insurer of the honesty and integrity of the sheriff.

• It requires no particularly acute mind to note that a dishonest sheriff could easily convert the money and abscond. The fact that the sheriff in the instant case required, not cash to be delivered to him, but rather a check made out in his name, does not change the legal situation. PAL did not thereby become negligent; it did not make the loss anymore possible or probable than if it had instead delivered plain cash to the sheriffs.

• Risk is most appropriately borne not by the judgment debtor, nor indeed by the judgment creditor, but by the State itself.

Padilla, J.
• PAL had every right to assume that, as an officer of the law, Sheriff Reyes would perform his duties as enjoined by law. If a judgment debtor cannot rely on and trust an officer of the law, as the Sheriff, whom else can he trust?

• The duty of the sheriff to pay the cash to the judgment creditor would be a matter separate the distinct from the fact that PAL would have satisfied its judgment obligation to Amelia Tan, the judgment creditor, by delivering the cash amount due under the judgment to Sheriff Reyes.

• When Sheriff Reyes encashed the checks, the encashment was in fact a payment by PAL to Amelia Tan through Sheriff Reyes, an officer of the law authorized to receive payment, and such payment discharged PAL’S obligation under the executed judgment.

• If the PAL cheeks in question had not been encashed by Sheriff Reyes, there would be no payment by PAL.

• The payment of money to the sheriff having an execution satisfies it, and, if the plaintiff fails to receive it, his only remedy is against the officer (Henderson v. Planters’ and Merchants Bank, 59 SO 493, 178 Ala. 420).

• Payment of an execution satisfies it without regard to whether the officer pays it over to the creditor or misapplies it (340, 33 C.J.S. 644, citing Elliot v. Higgins, 83 N.C. 459). If defendant consents to the Sheriff s misapplication of the money, however, defendant is estopped to claim that the debt is satisfied (340, 33 C.J.S. 644, citing Heptinstall v. Medlin 83 N.C. 16).

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